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Corruption and the Shadow Economy: 
A Structural Equation Model Approach 
 
The relationship between corruption and the shadow economy is not clear. Theoretically, 
they either substitute or complement each other – exhibiting either a negative or positive 
relationship. This paper – using a structural equation model with two latent variables – 
extracts information on various dimensions of corruption and the shadow economy to 
contribute to the debate on their relationship. It presents empirical evidence of a positive 
relationship between the shadow economy and corruption. The results show that the shadow 
economy influences corruption more than corruption influences the shadow economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Corruption and the existence of shadow economies are known but difficult to measure. What 
little evidence is available comes from surveys of leading international organizations, such as 
the World Bank. The accuracy of survey data is questionable, however, due to the delicate 
nature of topics such as bribery and/or illegal sources of income. Interviewees are not likely to 
provide truthful responses to questions like, “Did you yourself carry out any undeclared 
activities in the last 12 months?” or, “How much did you receive or pay in bribes last year?” 
Many researchers analyze corruption and the shadow economy independently of each 
other. Less research is done explicitly addressing the relationship between corruption and the 
shadow economy using empirical methods. From a theoretical standpoint corruption can 
either substitute or complement the shadow economy, but the precise nature of the 
relationship is not clear. This paper analyzes the link between corruption and the shadow 
economy empirically using a structural equation model (SEM). By modeling the two concepts 
as latent variables, we contribute to the debate on whether the shadow economy increases or 
decreases corruption and how corruption affects the shadow economy. 
In their influential paper, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) consider two corruption 
scenarios: corruption in a centralized bureaucracy and corruption in a decentralized 
bureaucracy. They find that a centralized bureaucracy reduces corruption because bureaucrats 
in a centralized bureaucracy take the negative impact of their actions on other bureaucrats into 
account when maximizing the amount of bribes. A decentralized economy, on the other hand, 
increases corruption because bureaucrats do not take this externality into consideration. More 
recent papers explore the link between corruption in the official economy and the size of the 
shadow economy. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) present a full-employment model 
in which individuals are employed either in the official or in the shadow economy. In this 
model, the shadow economy is a substitute for the official economy and exhibits a negative  
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relationship, i.e., an increase in the shadow economy results in a decrease in the official 
economy. Higher corruption in the official economy increases the size of the shadow 
economy – which functions like a tax on firms in the official economy and drives them 
underground. Hindriks, Muthoo, and Keen (1999) – in a model in which taxpayers collude 
with tax inspectors – also find a positive (complementary) relationship between corruption 
and the shadow economy (see also Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón, 1998b, and 
Friedman et al., 2000). 
Choi and Thum (2005) present a model in which the entrepreneur’s option to go 
underground constrains the corrupt bureaucrat’s ability to ask for bribes. The shadow 
economy mitigates distortions in the official economy and disables bureaucrats from realizing 
personal gains. The existence of the shadow economy thus reduces corruption, e.g. bribes. 
Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston (2005) extend this model by specifying institutional 
quality, whereby higher institutional quality reduces the shadow economy. The effect of 
institutional quality on corruption is ambiguous and depends on the effectiveness of anti-
corruption measures. Dreher Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston (2005) also show that corruption 
and the shadow economy are substitutes as the shadow economy imposes constraints on 
bureaucrats: when firms have the option of going underground, bureaucrats reduce the 
equilibrium level of bribes. Thus, similar to the findings of Choi and Thum (2005), corruption 
is lower in the presence of a shadow economy. 
In a recent paper, Echazu and Bose (2008) widen the analysis of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) and consider corrupt bureaucrats in the official and shadow economies. While 
horizontal (sectoral) centralization – in which two different bureaucrats participate in both the 
official and the shadow economy – lowers corruption, vertical centralization – in which one 
bureaucrat is charged with monitoring activities in the official and shadow economies –
increases corruption. This more in-depth analysis confirms the findings of Shleifer and  
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Vishny (1993) but contradicts the findings of Choi and Thum (2005). That is, centralization 
across the two sectors may increase corruption and reduce the size of the official economy. 
Thus, the official economy does not complement the shadow economy as it does in Choi and 
Thum (2005). 
Since the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy is ambiguous 
from a theoretical point of view, empirical investigations can make an interesting contribution 
to the literature. While Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston (2005) focus on the impact of 
institutional quality, Dreher and Schneider (2006) analyze corruption and the shadow 
economy using panel data. They find mixed evidence depending on the indicators chosen and 
the specification employed. We model corruption and the shadow economy as unobservable 
variables using a structural equation model with two latent variables and several causes and 
indicators. This approach has two main advantages over models in the existing literature. 
First, it extracts information from different dimensions of the shadow economy and 
corruption, enabling better estimation of the unobservable, multidimensional variables. 
Second, the structural equation model reveals the link between the two unobservable 
variables. To our knowledge, we are the first to analyze directly whether they exhibit a 
negative relationship – as shown in Choi and Thum (2005) – or a positive relationship – as 
shown in Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) or Echazu and Bose (2008). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the shadow 
economy and corruption. Section 3 introduces the structural equation model. Sections 4 and 5 
discuss the causes and indicators of the shadow economy and of corruption, respectively. 
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2. Defining the Shadow Economy and Corruption 
2.1 The Shadow Economy 
The shadow economy is an unobservable economic phenomenon, and no consensus exists as 
to the definition of the shadow economy.
1 For example, Smith (1994, p. 18) defines it as 
“market-based production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal, that escapes 
detection in official estimates of GDP.” Broader definitions of the shadow economy refer to 
economic activities – and income earned from them – that circumvent government regulation, 
taxation, or observation. Table 1 presents a classification which is helpful to develop a 
reasonable understanding of the shadow economy. 
From Table 1, it is clear that the shadow economy includes unreported income from 
otherwise official trade in goods and services, e.g. through monetary or barter transactions. 
Thus, all economic activities that would generally be taxable were they reported to 
governmental (tax) authorities are part of the shadow economy. This paper uses the following, 
more narrow definition of the shadow economy: all market-based, lawful trade in goods and 
services deliberately concealed from public authorities in order to evade:  
(1)  payment of income, value added or other taxes, respectively; 
(2) payment  of  social security taxes; 
(3)  certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum 
working hours, safety standards, etc.; or, 
(4)  compliance with administrative procedures, such as filling out paperwork. 




                                                 
1 This paper does not discuss aspects of measuring shadow economic activities. For an excellent survey on 
different measurement methodologies, see Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002).  
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Table 1. A Taxonomy of Types of Shadow Economic Activities 
Type of activity  Monetary transactions  Non-monetary transactions 
Illegal activities  Trade in stolen goods, drug dealing 
and manufacturing, prostitution, 
gambling, smuggling, fraud, etc.  
Barter of drugs, stolen goods, 
smuggling, etc., production or 
growing of drugs for own use, 
theft for own use. 
  Tax evasion  Tax avoidance  Tax evasion  Tax avoidance 




and assets from 
unreported work 
related to official/ 













Note: The Structure of the table is taken from Lippert and Walker (1997, p. 5) with additional remarks. 
 
2.2 Corruption 
Corruption – like the shadow economy – involves illegal activity. The most general definition 
of corruption is: the abuse of public power for private gains. The World Bank provides a 
narrower description: “[corruption] distorts the rule of law, weakens a nation's institutional 
foundation, and severely affects the poor who are already the most disadvantaged members of 
our society.” Consequently, corruption is “among the greatest obstacles to economic and 
social development” (Word Bank, 2009). Fighting corruption substantially improves 
economic performance. 
  There are numerous costs associated with corruption. First, corruption is a major 
obstacle to democracy as institutions lose legitimacy when they are used for private 
advantage. Second, corrupt bureaucrats often redistribute (scarce) public resources to high- 
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profile projects at the expense of less spectacular – but vital – public infrastructure projects 
such as schools and hospitals. Third, corruption hinders the development of fair market 
structures and distorts competition. Fourth, although the political and economic costs of 
corruption are severe, the most damaging cost affects the structure of society: corruption 
undermines people's trust in institutions and political leadership which, in turn, allows 
unscrupulous leaders to turn national assets into personal wealth. When demanding and 
paying bribes is socially acceptable, those who are unwilling to comply often emigrate – 
draining the country of its most able and honest citizens (Transparency International, 2009). 
 
3. A Structural Equation Model for Corruption and the Shadow Economy 
While international organizations like the World Bank require developing countries to fight 
corruption, anti-corruption measures may be ineffective if the reciprocal relationship between 
corruption and the shadow economy is not addressed. Plausible policy recommendations must 
take this link into account. A structural equation model (SEM) can provide useful information 
about the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy. The SEM models 
corruption and the shadow economy as two distinct latent variables and explores their 
relationship using the covariance structures between these latent variables’ observable causes 
and indicators. 
  Formally, the SEM consists of two parts: the structural equation model and the 
measurement model. The structural equation model can be represented by: 
,   ς Γx Βη η + + =                                                                                                              (1) 
where each  q i , xi , , 1     K =  in vector  ) , , , ( q 2 1 x x x K = ′ x  is a potential cause of one of the two 
latent variables contained in vector η. The individual coefficients  ) , , , ( q 2 1 γ γ γ K = ′ γ  in 
matrix Γ  describe the relationships between the latent variables and their causes. Each latent 
variable is determined by a set of exogenous causes. The error terms in vector ς  represent the  
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unexplained components, the covariance matrix for which is abbreviated by Ψ.  Φ is the 
) ( q q×  covariance matrix of the causes. The coefficient matrix Β shows the influence of the 
two latent variables on each other, i.e., the influence of the shadow economy on corruption 
and vice versa. 
  The measurement model links the latent variable to its multiple observable indicators, 
i.e., it is assumed that the latent variable determines its indicators. The measurement model 
provides information that single-indicator models do not. It is specified by: 
,   ε Λη y + =                                                                                                                      (2) 
where  ) , , , ( p 2 1 y y y K = ′ y  is the vector of indicators for corruption and the shadow 
economy,  Λ is a matrix of regression coefficients, and ε  is a  ) ( 1 p×  vector of white noise 
disturbances, the  ) ( p p×  covariance matrix for which is given by  ε Θ . 
  The model’s parameters are estimated using the information contained in the observed 
variables’ variance and covariance matrices.
2 Thus, the goal of the estimation procedure is to 
find values for the parameters and covariances that produce an estimate for the SEM model's 
covariance matrix  ) (θ Σ ,  ) ˆ ( ˆ θ Σ Σ =  that most closely corresponds to the sample covariance 
matrix of the observed causes and indicators. Having tested the hypotheses about the 
theoretical relationships between the latent variables and their causes and indicators, the 
relationship between corruption and the shadow economy can be analyzed. Figure 1 displays 






                                                 
2 For a detailed description of the methodology, see Bollen (1989).  
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Figure 1. The Structural Equation Model 
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where  1 η  and  2 η  are the latent variables for the shadow economy and corruption, 
respectively. Equations (3) and (4) represent the structural and measurement models, 
respectively. The estimation of the parameters  12 β  and  21 β  in the SEM model explain the 
relationship between the two latent variables  1 η  and  2 η , i.e., between the shadow economy 
and corruption.  12 β  describes the effect of  1 η  (the shadow economy) on  2 η  (corruption) 
while  21 β  describes the effect of  2 η  (corruption) on  1 η  (the shadow economy).  
 
4. Causes and Indicators of the Shadow Economy 
4.1 Causes of the Shadow Economy 
4.1.1 Tax Burden 
The selection of the shadow economy’s causes is based on theoretical and empirical evidence 
found in the literature. For example, high social security and other taxes are important causes 
of the shadow economy.
3 Taxes affect labor-leisure choices and stimulate the labor supply in 
the shadow economy. The greater the difference between the total cost of labor in the official 
economy and the unofficial (shadow) economy or when after-tax earnings from work in the 
official economy do not exceed earnings from work in the unofficial economy, the greater is 
the incentive to work in the shadow economy. 
                                                 
3 See Thomas (1992), Schneider (1986, 1997, 2003, 2005), Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a,b), 
Tanzi (1999), Giles, Tedds, and Werkneh (2002), and Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003).  
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  Neck, Hofreither, and Schneider (1989) analyze this relationship theoretically. They 
find that – under an additive-separable utility function and a two-stage decision setup of the 
consumer – higher marginal (income) tax rates imply greater labor supply in the shadow 
economy. Schneider (1994b, 2000) and Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a,b) 
provide statistically significant empirical evidence that higher taxes have a positive effect on 
the shadow economy. 
  Unfortunately, information about marginal tax rates is not typically available on a 
broad basis. When government spending increases relative to private spending or when the 
government redistributes income by raising social security and other taxes, individual 
freedom vis-à-vis spending decisions is reduced. The substitution of political choice over 
private choice, i.e. higher government expenditure and/or taxes creates an incentive for 
individuals to work in the shadow economy. We use government consumption, the size of 
government, and transfers and subsidies as variables to measure the influence of government 
on the size of the shadow economy.
4 We hypothesize that: 
 
(1)  The more countries rely on the political process to redistribute income – i.e., the 
higher the tax rate and, thus, the lower individual economic freedom – the larger the shadow 
economy, ceteris paribus. 
 
4.1.2 Intensity of Regulation 
The intensity of regulation is another important cause for the existence of the shadow 
economy. Examples of regulations include labor market regulations, such as minimum wages 
and hiring/firing regulations, licensing restrictions, and trade barriers. The intensity of 
regulation can be measured by the total number of laws and regulations, the size of staff at 
                                                 
4 We are restricted to these indirect measures of social security and other taxes in the empirical analysis because 
using more direct measures, such as tax revenues or social security contributions as a percentage of official GDP, 
substantially reduces the sample size.  
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regulatory agencies, or the total time it takes to start a business. In general, regulations lead to 
a substantial increase in labor costs in the official economy. Since most of these costs can be 
shifted onto employees, regulations provide an incentive to work in the shadow economy – 
where these costs can be avoided. An increase in the intensity of regulation also reduces the 
freedom (of choice) for individuals engaged in the official economy. 
  The impact of regulation on the shadow economy has been analyzed theoretically as 
well as empirically. The model of Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) shows that those 
countries with a more regulated economy have a larger shadow economy. Significant 
empirical evidence of the influence of (labor) market regulations on the shadow economy is 
also presented in Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998b). We hypothesize that: 
 
(2)  The higher the regulation intensity, the larger the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
 
4.1.3 Labor Market 
Unemployment also affects the size of the shadow economy. While consensus exists that high 
labor costs cause unemployment in the countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the impact of high unemployment on the shadow 
economy is ambiguous. On the one hand, higher unemployment increases the incentive to 
demand goods and services in the shadow economy – which are often much cheaper. On the 
other hand, unemployed people have less money to purchase goods and services, even in the 
shadow economy, so a negative relationship can prevail. 
  Whether unemployment exhibits a positive or negative relationship with the shadow 
economy depends on the income and the substitution effect. Income losses due to 
unemployment reduce demand in both the shadow and official economies. A substitution of 
official demand for goods and services for unofficial demand takes place as unemployed  
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workers turn to the shadow economy – where cheaper goods and services make it easier to 
countervail utility losses. This behavior may stimulate additional demand in the shadow 
economy. If the income effect exceeds the substitution effect, a negative relationship 
develops. Likewise, if the substitution effect exceeds the income effect, the relationship is 
positive. In developed countries, however, unemployment benefits often offset the loss of 
income caused by unemployment. Because of the theoretical ambiguity, we do not formulate 
a hypothesis about the relationship between unemployment – measured by the unemployment 
rate - and the shadow economy. 
 
4.2 Indicators of the Shadow Economy 
In addition to the causal variables – which determine the size and development of the shadow 
economy – three indicator variables are used to make the unobservable shadow economy 
visible: the ratio of M0 to M1, the growth rate of official gross domestic product (GDP), and 
the labor force participation rate. As explained in Section 3, the challenge of the measurement 
part of the structural equation model is to select those indicators that appear to be influenced 
by the latent variable, ceteris paribus. The three indicator variables selected mirror activities 
in the shadow economy particularly well, as explained below. 
  The first indicator is the ratio of M0 to M1. Transactions in the shadow economy are 
typically carried out using cash as this protects the principal and the agent in their shadow 
economic activities. Cash holdings thus reflect shadow economic activity. We therefore 
expect a positive relationship between the shadow economy and currency in circulation and 
hypothesize that: 
 
(3)   The larger the shadow economy, the more cash circulates, ceteris paribus. 
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  The effects of the shadow economy on resource allocation and, thus, on the official 
economy are ambiguous. The shadow economy can be seen as positive response to the 
demand for an entrepreneurial environment and the creation of new markets. The shadow 
economy can enhance entrepreneurship, increase efficiency and, in turn, stimulate growth in 
the official economy. Adam and Ginsburgh (1985) derive the positive relationship between 
the shadow economy and resource allocation theoretically under the assumption of low entry 
costs and a low probability of enforcement in the shadow economy. 
  The shadow economy can also be seen as a negative response to high taxation and 
overregulation. It is often argued, for example, that activities in the shadow economy are not 
subject to taxation. Shifting them to the official economy leads to an increase in governmental 
tax revenues – which increases the quality and/or quantity of public goods. As public 
infrastructure is a key element of economic growth, a larger (smaller) shadow economy 
reduces (increases) growth in the official economy. Loayza (1996) provides empirical 
evidence of the negative relationship between the shadow economy and resource allocation. 
We follow this reasoning and hypothesize that: 
 
(4)   The larger the shadow economy, the smaller official GDP growth, ceteris paribus. 
 
  The labor force participation rate can also serve as an important indicator of the 
shadow economy. Changes in the participation rate reflect empirically a flow of resources 
between the official and the shadow economy. The expected sign of the relationship between 
the shadow economy and the labor force participation rate is however ambiguous. No 
consensus exists in the literature as to whether the shadow economy really affects the labor 
force participation rate. For example, Bajada and Schneider (2005) argue that this is not the  
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case while Giles (1998) argues that the labor force participation rate reflects a movement of 
the workforce from the official to the shadow economy. 
  Although the labor force participation rate is widely used as indicator of the shadow 
economy in empirical studies, the expected relationship is debatable. Over the last thirty 
years, the composition of the labor force has changed considerably. As it is not clear whether 
changes in the labor force participation rate are caused by changes of the shadow economy or 
by other reasons, e.g. by a growing female participation in the workforce (Dell’ Anno, 2007), 
we do not formulate a hypothesis regarding the effect of the shadow economy on the labor 
force participation rate. 
 
5. Causes and Indicators of Corruption 
As with the selection of causes and indicators of the shadow economy, the selection of causes 
and indicators of corruption is based on previous findings of the relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature. We discuss first the causal variables and then the indicators. For clarity, 
the causes are grouped into three main categories: political and judicial causes, social and 
cultural causes, and economic causes. 
 
5.1 Causes of Corruption 
5.1.1 Political and Judicial Causes of Corruption 
The political and judicial causes capture a country’s democratic and institutional quality and 
the quality of the political system, respectively. It is widely believed that corruption is related 
to the deficiencies in the political system and that sound administrative systems, clear rules, 
and a long tradition of institution-building deter corruption. Promoting political competition 
and increasing transparency and accountability can reduce the scope for bribery. Other  
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characteristics of a country’s political system, such as electoral rules and the degree of 
decentralization, affect corruption (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, or Echazu and Bose, 2008). 
  Political and judicial factors feature prominently in many recent studies of the 
importance of governance for economic development (see, for example, North, 1990, or 
Easterly and Levine, 1997). While strong and efficient legal systems protect property rights 
and provide a stable framework for economic activity, weak legal systems fail to provide such 
an environment. This undermines market operations, reduces individuals’ incentives to 
participate in productive activities, and encourages unproductive activities like corruption. We 
therefore hypothesize that: 
 
(5)  The lower the quality of the political system and policy formulation and the lower the 
respect for the rule of law, the higher the level of corruption, ceteris paribus. 
 
5.1.2 Social and Cultural Causes of Corruption 
Many individuals in poor countries with low literacy rates have little understanding of 
governmental operations (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). For them, it is often not clear what they 
should expect from a legitimate government, and corruption results from the tradition that one 
present gifts to show gratitude for favorable decisions (Pasuk and Sungsidh, 1994). Thus, 
corruption is less a matter of bargaining than it is of cultural and social exchange. Highly 
corrupt countries often underinvest in public education (Mauro, 1998) and human capital, 
thereby perpetuating ignorance of governmental operations. We use the primary school 
enrollment rate to account for society and culture’s influence on corruption and hypothesize 
that: 
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(6)  The lower the primary school enrollment rate, the higher the level of corruption, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
5.1.3 Economic Causes of Corruption 
Governments often interfere with the economy in terms of the regulatory environment and the 
fiscal burden imposed on individuals. This interference is said to reduce economic freedom. 
Greater economic freedom is said to reduce corruption because individuals face more choice 
in doing business, less red tape, and fewer bureaucratic hassles.
5 Greater government 
interference increases corruption – causing both bribe takers and bribe seekers to engage in 
activities that circumvent rules and regulations. 
  Tanzi (1998) and Dreher, Kosogiannis, and McCorriston (2007)  emphasize the size of 
the public sector as it offers bureaucrats some degree of discretion in the allocation of goods 
and services: the more significant the role of the public sector, the higher the level of 
corruption. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find that this relationship is stronger when 
bureaucrats’ wages are relatively low. Treisman’s (2000), however, finds no evidence to 
support Van Rijckeghem and Weder’s (2001) findings. We hypothesize that: 
 
(7)  The lower the economic freedom – i.e., the higher the level of government 
interference – the higher the level of corruption, ceteris paribus. 
 
5.2 Indicators of Corruption 
The existing literature offers some guidance with respect to appropriate indicators for 
corruption. Since it is generally accepted that corruption is what makes poor countries poor, 
GDP per capita is an obvious choice to indicate corruption. Corruption disrupts economic 
                                                 
5 For more on the influence of economic freedom on corruption, see Bardan (1997) or Goel and Nelson (2005).  
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development and is seen as responsible for Africa’s lasting poverty and Latin America’s 
stagnation. Almost all available evidence suggests that corruption has a negative effect on 
economic development (see, for example, Mauro, 1995 and Paldam, 2003). We hypothesize 
that: 
 
(8)  The higher the level of corruption, the lower the level of economic development – as 
measured by per capita GDP, ceteris paribus. 
 
The final set of indicators measures the extent of corruption in a society. A natural choice is to 
use an index of bribes and extra payments derived from responses to the following question: 
“In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented extra 
payments or bribes?” (Gwartney, Lawson, and Norton, 2008, p. 194).
6 In additio n to the 
“bribe payers index,” we employ a variable that measures judicial independence, i.e., whether 
the judiciary is impartial to political influence by members of government, lobbyists and 
special interest groups, and private citizens and/or businesses. We expect a positive 
correlation between these variables and the latent variable of corruption. 
 
6. Empirical Application 
6.1 Data 
In the application of the structural equation model, we consider annual data for 51 countries 
from 2000 to 2005. We are restricted to annual data since few of the variables are available at 
higher frequencies. Also, some of the variables were surveyed only every other year. All data 
is publicly available and is provided by international organizations such as the World Bank or 
is taken from published research papers. Table A.1 in the Appendix presents a comprehensive 
                                                 
6 Other variables which fit into this category are corruption indices such as the freedom from corruption index 
presented in Gwartney, Lawson, and Norton (2008).  
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overview of the variables, definitions, and data sources. 
  Among the 51 countries included in the sample, 10 are OECD countries and 6 are non-
OECD “high income countries” as defined by the World Bank.
7 The remaining countries are 
emerging markets, which can be divided into advanced and secondary emerging markets as 
suggested by the FTSE Group.
8 Taking further into account the advanced emerging markets 
of Brazil and South Africa, altogether, 18 – or more than one-third – of the 51 countries are 
developed countries while 33 – or less than two-thirds – are developing countries. We 
conclude that the sample is well-balanced. Appendix provides a complete list of countries 
included in the sample. 
  Figure 2 – which plots the size of the shadow economy against the extent of 
corruption for 45 out of the 51 countries in the sample – provides some preliminary evidence 
of the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy. To calculate the shadow 
economy for each country, we average Schneider’s (2006) estimates for 2001, 2002, and 
2003. To measure the extent of corruption, we average the country’s score on Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2001, 2002, and 2003. 
  As can be seen from Figure 2, the countries can be grouped into two categories: 
industrialized countries with relatively small shadow economies and low levels of corruption 
and developing or emerging countries with significant shadow economies and relatively high 
levels of corruption. The relationship between corruption and the shadow economy appears to 
be positive for both groups – with the exception of Tunisia and Uruguay in the second group. 
The latter two countries – though they exhibit shadow economies similar in size to the other 
countries in their group – are less corrupt. India, Indonesia, and Paraguay are amongst the 
most corrupt countries in the sample but –compared to the other countries in their group – 
                                                 
7 The World Bank defines “high income countries” as having annual per capita Gross National Incomes (GNI) of 
$11,456 or more. Our classification uses the 2007 per capita GNI. 
8 Advanced emerging markets include upper middle-income countries with advanced market infrastructures or 
high-income countries with less-developed market infrastructures. In our sample, Brazil and South Africa are 
treated as advanced emerging markets.  
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exhibit relatively smalls shadow economies. Figure 2 thus provides some initial proof that 
corruption and the shadow economy are linked and that the relationship is similar within each 
group.
9 Table A.2 in the Appendix lists the countries in rank order according to the CPI, the 
CPI country score, and the size of the shadow economy for the set of 45 countries for which 
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Figure 2. Scatter Plot of the Relationship between Corruption and the Shadow Economy 
Note: Both, the CPI Country Score and the shadow economy estimates, taken from Schneider (2006), are 
average values over the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. Higher values of the CPI index indicate lower levels of 
perceived corruption in the respective country. 
 
6.2 Results 
As explained in Section 3, the application of a structural equation model implies that 
observable variables indicate the shadow economy and corruption. According to the 
                                                 
9 The latter argument is also reflected by an insignificant dummy variable included in the empirical analysis to 
test for a significant difference between the two groups of countries.  
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theoretical considerations in Section 4, we employ the growth rate of real GDP, the ratio of 
the monetary aggregates M0 to M1 as a transaction variable, and the labor force participation 
rate to make shadow economic activities ‘visible’. We expect a positive relationship between 
the transaction variable and the shadow economy and a negative relationship between the 
growth rate of GDP and the shadow economy. 
  We use real GDP per capita, an index measuring the prevalence of bribery, and an 
index measuring integrity of the judiciary to indicate corruption. We expect a negative 
relationship between real GDP per capita and corruption since corruption is inversely related 
to economic development. Since higher scores on the judicial integrity index indicate greater 
judicial independence, we expect a negative relationship between corruption and the index of 
judicial integrity. We use the inverse of the bribery index so that the lower the value, the 
lower the prevalence of bribery. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between corruption 
and the prevalence of bribery. 
  We use the unemployment rate of the male population, indices measuring the labor 
market and business regulations, government consumption, and transfers and subsidies to 
capture causes of the shadow economy. Government consumption and transfers and subsidies 
are used to proxy the financial burden resulting from taxes. We expect a positive relationship 
between the rate of male unemployment and the shadow economy. For the labor market and 
business regulation indices as well as for government consumption, lower scores indicate 
greater government interference in the economy. To make the empirical results comparable to 
our theoretical hypotheses, we transform these indices by using the inverse of the original 
scores. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between these three variables and the shadow 
economy. 
As explained in Section 5, we explore the political, social, and economic causes of 
corruption. In our benchmark specification (1) the rule of law and government effectiveness  
   22  of  39 
are used to capture the political causes of corruption. We expect that greater respect for the 
rule of law and better institutional quality reduce corruption. A measure for bureaucracy costs 
is used to capture the economic causes of corruption. For this index, higher scores indicate 
stricter regulations and, thus, higher bureaucratic costs. Thus, we expect that higher 
bureaucratic costs increase corruption. Figure 3 shows the structural equation model’s path 
diagram for the benchmark specification whereby the small squares attached to the arrows 
indicate the expected sign in the empirical analysis. 
Figure 3. Path Diagram of the Benchmark Model 
 
Once causes and indicators have been selected, the model can be estimated to derive the 
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indicators. Table 2 presents the estimation results. For simplicity, the goodness-of-fit statistics 
for each specification are presented separately – in Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
  The following discusses causes and indicators for the shadow economy and for 
corruption. It is important to note that the identification and estimation of the structural 
equation model requires the normalization of one of the indicators of each latent variable to an 
a priori value. Typically, the indicator variable that loads most on the construct represented 
by the latent variable is used. We therefore set the coefficient of the indicators real GDP 
growth and real GDP per capita to -1 following our theoretical considerations of Section 4.
10 
  Most of the estimated coefficients of the shadow economy’s causes are statistically 
significant at conventional levels and have the theoretically expected sign. The coefficients 
reveal that business regulations and labor market conditions are the most important 
determinants of the shadow economy. Specification (2) – in which the unemployment rate is 
substituted for a direct measure of labor market regulations – confirms this observation. We 
also find that taxation and redistribution are important – as demonstrated by the significant 
coefficient of the government consumption variable.  This effect is less significant for 
specification (3) – in which government consumption is substituted for the variable measuring 
the size of government. The coefficient for the variable ‘transfers and subsidies’ is not 
statistically significant. 
  With regard to the shadow economy’s indicators, we find – as hypothesized – a 
positive relationship between the shadow economy and the transaction measure. We find 
negative relationships between the shadow economy and the growth rate of real GDP and 
between the shadow economy and the labor force participation rate. Our findings confirm the 
findings of other theoretical and empirical papers. 
 
                                                 
10 This is a convenient and widely accepted method of normalization which does not affect the qualitative 
results. For more details, see Bollen (1989).  
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Table 2. Estimation Results (Standardized Coefficients) 
Specification  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
Latent  Variables  SE C  SE C  SE  C  SE C  SE C 
Causes            




























Government Consumption  0.16** 
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0.11* 
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Table 2 (continued).            
Specification  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
Latent  Variables  SE C  SE C  SE  C  SE C  SE C 
Indicators             
GDP  Growth  -0.51   -0.47   -0.46   -0.50   -0.51   






















Real  GDP  per  Capita    -0.78   -0.75   -0.74   -0.78   -0.77 



















Freedom  from  Corruption           0.12 
(1.46) 
Latent variables            
























Absolute z-statistics appear in parenthesis. * = significance at 10% level, ** significance at 5 % level, *** = significance at 1% level. 
Note: SE = shadow economy; C = corruption. 
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With respect to the causes of corruption, we find a highly statistically significant coefficient 
for bureaucracy costs – which indicates that lower economic freedom increases corruption. In 
specification (4), school enrollment is used to proxy social causes of corruption, as is done in 
Treisman (2000). We find no evidence to support Treisman’s argument that a more educated 
and literate population is less prone to corruption. While the coefficient for the rule of law is 
not statistically significant, the coefficient for government effectiveness is and has the 
theoretically expected sign. This means that countries with weaker quality of policy 
formulation and more political pressure on public policy have higher levels of corruption, 
ceteris paribus. We also consider fiscal freedom as cause of corruption and find that – as 
hypothesized – lower fiscal freedom increases corruption. 
  The indicator variables of corruption are fairly consistent across all model 
specifications and have the expected signs. Lower levels of real GDP per capita, i.e., lower 
levels of economic development, are associated with higher levels of corruption. The 
prevalence of bribery index shows that – as expected – a higher prevalence of bribery 
indicates a higher level of corruption. The variable capturing judicial independence is, 
however, not statistically significant. In specification (5), we substitute the variable measuring 
judicial independence for the freedom from corruption index for – which is, unfortunately, 
also not statistically significant. 
  Since our findings for both latent variables confirm the findings of earlier theoretical 
and empirical research, we consider interpreting the estimated coefficients of the mutual 
relationship between corruption and the shadow economy. Both coefficients – measuring the 
influence of the shadow economy on corruption and the influence of corruption on the 
shadow economy –are statistically significant and positive. The positive mutual relationship 
between corruption and the shadow economy is robust and stable across all estimated 
specifications. The structural equation model presents empirical evidence in support of the  
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theoretical model presented in Echazu and Bose (2008). It does not support the model 
presented in Choi and Thum (2005) – in which corruption and the shadow economy are 
substitutes rather than complements. 
  Although the coefficients for corruption and the shadow economy are both positive, 
they differ substantially in magnitude. That is, the causal effect of the shadow economy on 
corruption is stronger than the effect of corruption on the shadow economy. One possible 
explanation for this is that corruption functions as an additional tax in the official economy – 
which, in turn, increases the size of the shadow economy. Likewise, the shadow economy 
induces higher corruption as bureaucrats exploit their positions of power and as firms or 
individuals willingly pay bribes and hide their underground activities. In addition, the shadow 
economy can also be seen as an indication of overall deterioration of social and cultural 
norms, which results in even more widespread corruption. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the debate about the relationship between corruption and the shadow 
economy using a structural equation model. We do not hypothesize whether the shadow 
economy and corruption are complements or substitutes, i.e., whether the shadow economy 
and corruption are positively or negatively related to each other. Rather, we test this 
relationship empirically. 
  Our findings reveal that a large shadow economy is linked to high levels of corruption. 
In countries with large shadow economies, firms and individuals often rely to a large extent 
on shadow economic activities. In order to avoid detection, taxation, and punishment, they 
bribe bureaucrats. Moreover, low tax revenues reduce the quality of public services and 
infrastructure. This in turn reduces the incentives to remain in the official economy. Weaker 
legal systems and unstable conditions for economic activity increase corruption. Acting like  
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an extra tax corruption drives individuals underground. Thus, the empirical relationship 
between corruption and the shadow economy confirms the findings of Johnson, Kaufmann, 
and Shleifer (1997), Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998b), Hindriks, Muthoo, and 
Keen (1999), and Friedman et al. (2000). Clearly, the structural equation model presented in 
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Table A.1. Data Sources and Definitions 
Category  Variable and Definition  Source 
Causes for the Shadow Economy   
Economic Freedom 
and Taxation 
Government consumption measured as general 
government consumption spending as a 
percentage of total consumption. 
Gwartney, Lawson, 
and Norton (2008) 
  Transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP 
measure the tax burden imposed by governments 
in order to provide transfers to others and the 
reduced freedom of individuals to keep what 
they earn. 
Gwartney, Lawson, 
and Norton (2008) 
  Size of Government indicates the extent to 
which countries rely on the political process to 
allocate resources, goods and services. 
Gwartney, Lawson, 
and Norton (2008) 
Regulation  Labor market regulations measure the 
influence of standards such as minimum wages 
and dismissal regulations. 
Gwartney, Lawson, 
and Norton (2008) 
  Business regulations measure the extent of 
unnecessary regulatory barriers and the 
administrative costs of doing business. 
Gwartney, Lawson, 
and Norton (2008) 
Labor Market  Unemployment rate (male) refers to the share 
of the labor force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment 
World Bank (2008) 
Indicators of the Shadow Economy   
Transaction 
Measure 
Ratio of the monetary aggregate M0 to  the 
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Official Economic 
Activity 
Growth rate of real GDP  World Bank (2008) 
  Labor force participation rate is the 
proportion of the population ages 15-64 that is 
economically active 
World Bank (2008) 
 




Government effectiveness measures inter alia 
the independence of public services from 
political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 
Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2007) 
 The  Rule of Law measures the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the 
quality of contract enforcement, the police, and 
the courts. 
Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2007) 
Social and Cultural 
Factors 
 
Gross school enrollment is the ratio of total 
enrollment, regardless of age, to the population 
of the age group that officially corresponds to 
the level of education shown. 
World Bank (2008) 
Economic Factors  Bureaucracy costs measure how stringent 
standards on product/service quality, energy and 
other regulations in a country are. 
Gwartney, Lawson, 
and Norton (2008) 
  Fiscal freedom is the freedom of individuals 
and businesses to keep and control their income 
and wealth for their own benefit and use. 
Miller et al. (2008) 
Indicators of Corruption   
Economic 
Development 
Real GDP per capita  World Bank (2008)  
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Measures of 
Corruption 
The index ‘Extra payments / payment of 
bribes‘ indicates individuals’ perceptions about 
how common it is in a country that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes. 
Gwartney, Lawson, 
and Norton (2008) 
  Judicial independence shows if the judiciary in 
a country is independent from political 
influences of members of government, citizens, 
or firms. 
Gwartney, Lawson, 
and Norton (2008) 
  Freedom from corruption index measures 
failures of integrity in the system, i.e. the 
distortion by which individuals are able to 
achieve personal gains at the expense of the 
general public. 
Miller et al. (2008) 
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Table A.2. Corruption and Size of the Shadow Economy 
Country Ranking 
(CPI) 
Country  CPI Country Score  Shadow Economy  
(% of Official GDP) 
1 New  Zealand  9.5  12.5 
2 Singapore  9.3  13.6 
3 Canada  8.9  15.5 
4 Australia  8.6  13.8 
 Norway  8.6  18.7 
 Switzerland  8.6  9.4 
7 USA  7.6  8.6 
8 Chile  7.5  20.6 
9 Israel  7.3  23.4 
10 Japan  7.1  11.0 
11 Uruguay  5.2  51.7 
12 Malaysia  5.0  31.9 
 Tunisia  5.0  39.5 
14 Jordan  4.7  21.1 
 South  Africa  4.7  29.3 
16 Costa  Rica  4.4  27.4 
17 Brazil  4.0  41.6 
18 Peru  3.9  60.6 
 Jamaica  3.9  38.4 
20 Colombia  3.7  42.4 
21 Mexico  3.6  32.6 
 El  Salvador  3.6  47.7  
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 Sri  Lanka  3.6  46.6 
24 Morocco  3.5  37.5 
25 Egypt  3.4  36.5 
26 Dominican  Republic  3.3  33.8 
 Turkey  3.3  33.7 
28 Thailand  3.2  53.8 
29 Ethiopia  3.0  41.8 
 Mali  3.0  44.3 
31 Argentina  2.9  28.0 
32 India  2.7  24.9 
 Philippines  2.7  45.1 
34 Algeria  2.6  35.3 
 Guatemala  2.6  52.2 
 Honduras  2.6  51.2 
 Venezuela  2.6  35.9 
38 Nicaragua  2.5  47.6 
 Pakistan  2.5  38.3 
40 Ecuador  2.2  35.9 
 Bolivia  2.2  68.3 
 Madagascar  2.2  41.0 
43 Uganda  2.1  45.1 
44 Indonesia  1.9  22.4 
45 Paraguay  1.7  30.3 
Note: The CPI Country Score and the shadow economy estimates, taken from Schneider (2006), are 
average values over the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. Cyprus, Iceland, Malta, Mauritius, South Korea, and 
Trinidad and Tobago are not displayed in the Table as no shadow economy estimates are available. 
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Table A.3. Goodness-of-fit Measures 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Chi-square  97.23 97.36 92.14 99.03 93.19 
Degrees of Freedom  81  81  81  81  81 
P-value  0.11 0.10 0.19 0.08 0.17 
No. of Observations  168  168  168  168  168 
Root Mean Squared Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Goodness-of-fit  Index  (GFI)  0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.93 
Adjusted Goodness-of-fit Index 
(AGFI) 
0.90 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.90 
Note: The goodness-of-fit statistics for the estimated model specifications show an acceptable fit. If the model 
fits the data perfectly and the parameter values are known, the sample covariance matrix equals the covariance 
matrix implied by the model, i.e.  () θ Σ = S . The null hypothesis of perfect fit corresponds to a p-value of 1. 
Thus, the chi-square test of exact fit accepts all models. Also, the RMSEA is smaller than 0.05 in the 
specifications. Other measures such as GFI and AGFI also provide evidence of an acceptable fit. 